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AND THE OPERATIONS OF
U.S. MULTINATIONALS
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the impact of the 1986 change in U.S. interest allocation rules on
the investment and financing decisions of American multinationals. The 1986 change reduced
thetaxdeductibilityof the interestexpenses of firms with excess foreign tax credits. The
resulting increase in the costofdebtgivesfinns incentives to substituteawayfrom using debt
finance. Furthermore, to the extent that perfect financing substitutes are not available, the overall
cost of capital rises as well. The empirical tests indicate that the loss of tax deductibility of
parent-company interest expenses appears to reduce significantly borrowing and investing by
firms with excess foreign tax credits. The same firms tend to undertake new lease commitments,
which may reflect the use of leases as alternatives to capital ownership. In addition, firms
affected by the tax change tend to scale back the scope of their foreign and total operations.
These results are consistent with the hypothesis that firms substitute away from debt when debt
becomes more expensive, and also with the hypothesis that the loss of interest tax shields
increases a firm's cost of capital.
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Internationalbusiness operations pose speciai tax problems for multinational firms as
well as the governments that tax them. Multinational firms often centralize certain activities that
generate returnsin more than one country.For example, firms may borrow money in one country in
order to deploy the funds elsewhere. Firms are entitled to claim tax deductions for interest costs, but
countries in which they borrow may not permit all of the associated interest expenses to be deducted
against local income for tax purposes. The method used to calculate allowable interest tax deductions
can, in turn, affect tinar.cing choices and operating decisions.
American tax law permits only incomplete deductibility of the interest expenses of
multinational firms. U.S.lawspecifies rules that detennine the extent to which interest costs incured
by multinational firms in the United States can be deducted for tax purposes against U.S. income.
These rules are often changed, the last major change occuring in 1986.
This paper examines the impact on firm behavior of the change in the U.S. interest
allocation rules introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The 1986 Act significantly reduced the
tax deductibility of the U.S. interest expenses of certain American multinational corporations.
Congress changed the law in 1986 because it was concerned that some U.S.-based firmsreceived tax
deductions for interest expenses in the United States that enhanced their profits overseas. The 1986
Act introduced a new formula for multinational firms to use in calculating the fraction of their interest
expenses that can be deducted against taxable income in the UnitedStates.
This tax change increased the tax liabilities of certain American multinationals, and
made additional borrowing more expensive for these firms. One of the concerns raised during the
deliberations over the 1986 Act was that this additional cost of borrowing might discourage some
firms from investing in new plant and equipment, since a sizable fraction of new investment is
financed by borrowing. The object of this paper is to examine the impact of the tax change on the
operations of those multinational firms that were affected by the change in interestallocation rules.To do so, it is necessary to compare the behavior of the affected firms to the behavior of those firms
that were unaffected by the interest allocation provisions of the 1986 Act.
The results indicate that the change in interest allocation rules significantly influenced
the operations of Americanmultinational firms. Firms that were unable to deduct all oftheir interest
expenses against their U.S. tax liabilities issued4.2percent less debt between1986-1991(measured
as a fraction of total firm assets), and invested 3.5 percent less in property, plant, and equipment,
than did other firms. In addition, the affected firms showed a greaterproclivityto leaseratherthan
own capital assets, and to reduce the scope of their foreign operations. MI of these behavioral
responses are consistent with the incentives created by the interest allocation provisions of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
Section II describes the U.S. tax treatment of the interest expenses of multinational
corporations, and analyzes the incentives created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Section III
describes the data used to analyze the impact of the 1986 tax change. Section IV presents the results
ol' regressions that estimate the impact of the 1986 tax change on various aspectsofthe operations of
American multinational firms. Section V is the conclusion.
II.The Tax Treatment ofInterest Expense
This section describes the tax treatment of interest expenses of U.S. corporations,
paying special attention to the treatment of multinational corporations. The object of this section is to
identify the incentives created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, as a prelude to analyzing the impact
of the Act on the behavior of U.S. firms.
Interest expenses are generally deductible against the taxable income of U.S.
corporations. There are, however, two important circumstances in which the deductibility of interest
is of limited value to an interest-paying corporation. The first arises when a corporation has negative
2protits before interest deductions. Since a firm with losses pays no taxes, interest deductions do not
reduce its tax liability. Corporations are, however, permitted to carry net operating losses backward
up to threeyearsor forward up to fifteen years.1 The second circumstance is oneinwhich a firmis
subjectto the corporate Alternative Minimum Tax (AMD; firms paying the AMT lace idiosyncratic
tax incentives.3
A. Foreign and DomesticAllocation of Interest Deductions
Specialproblems arise in allocating the interest deductions of multinational firms.
The idea that underlies U.S. law is that, when a. multinational firm incurs interest expense in the
United States, a certainfractionof the expense should be allocated as a deduction against taxable
domestic income, and the remainder allocated against the firm's foreign income. The respective
fractions are determined on the basis of the income-generating capacity created by the loans on which
interest is paid. The extreme difticuliy that this concept encounters is that it is not always clear to
what extent a particular loan generates domestic-source and foreign-source income.
In order to understand the significance of the sourcing of interest deductions, it is
necessary to review the treatment of foreign-source income. Due to some peculiaritiesof the changes
in U.S. tax law after 1986, certain firms found that the cost of debt changed significantly between
1986 and 1987. The goal of the empirical work described in section 3 is to follow and compare the
behavior of those firms facing higher costs of debt to those firms facing unchanged cost of debt.
'Tax loss carryforwards do not accrue interest, a feature that limits their value even to firms that
expect to have taxable profits in the ftiture. Scholes and Wolfson (1992) analyzethe value of tax loss
carryforwards in uncertain environments.
2For the remainder of the paper, we analyze taxpaying firms that are not subject to the AMT.
Lyon and Silverstein (1993) report that 30.7% of firms with assets over $500million paid the AMT in
1990.
3B. US Taxation of Foreign Income'
TheUnited States taxes incomeona "residence" basis,meaningthat American
corporations and individuals owe taxes to the U.S. government on all of their worldwide income,
whether earned in the United States or not. The top U.S. corporate tax rate is now 35 percent. Since
foreign profits are usually taxed in host countries, U.S. law provides a foreign tax credit for income
taxes (and related taxes) paid to foreign governments in order not to subject American multinationals
to double taxation. With the foreign tax credit, a U.S. corporation that earns $100 in a foreign
country with a 12 percent tax rate (and a foreign tax obligation of $12) pays only $23 to the U.S.
government, since its U.S. corporate tax liability of $35 (35 percent of $100) is reduced to $23 by the
foreign tax credit of $12. The foreign tax credit is, however, limited to U.S. tax liability on foreign
income; if, in the example, the foreign tax rate were 50 percent, then the firm pays $50 to the foreign
government but its U.S. foreign tax credit is limited to $35.Hence,a U.S. firm receives full tax
credits for its foreign taxes paid only when it is in a "deficit credit" position, i.e., when itsaverage
foreign tax rate is lower than its tax rate on domestic operations. A firm has "excess credits" if its
available foreign tax credits exceed U.S. tax liability on its foreign income.4 Firms average together
their taxable incomes and taxes paid in all of their foreign operations in calculating foreign tax credits
and the foreign tax credit limit.
Deferral of U.S. taxation of certain foreign earnings is another important feature of
the U.S. international tax system. A U.S. parent firm is taxed on its subsidiaries' foreign income
only when returned ("repatriated") to the parent corporation. This type of deferral is available only
to foreign operations that are separately incorporated in foreign countries ("subsidiaries" of the
'Parts of this brief description of the tax system are excerpted from Hines (1991).
'Furthermore, income is broken into different functional "baskets" in the calculation of applicable
credits and limits. In order to qualify for the foreign tax credit, firms must own at least 10% of a foreign
affiliate, and only those taxes that qualify as income taxes are creditable.
4parent) and not to consolidated ('brancW) operations. The U.S.governmenttaxes branch profits as
they are earned, just as it does profits earned within the United States.
The deferral of U.S. taxation may create incentives for firms with lightly-taxed
foreign earnings to delay repatriating dividends from their foreign subsidiaries.5 This incentive arises
in those cases in which firms expect never to repatriate their foreign earnings, or if they anticipate
that future years will be more attractive for repatriation (either because domestic tax rates will be
lower, or because future sources of foreign income will generate excess foreign tax credits that can be
used to offset U.S. tax liability on the dividends).' It appears that, in practice, U.S. multinationals
choose their dividend repatriations selectively, generally paying dividends first out of more heavily
taxed foreign earnings.' Consequently, the average tax rate that firms face on foreign income need
not exactly equal the average foreign tax rate faced by their branches and subsidiaries abroad.
Branch earnings and dividends from subsidiaries represent only two forms of foreign
income for U.S. income tax purposes. Interest received from foreign sources also represents foreign
income, though foreign interest receipts from high-tax countries are assigned their own "basket" and
therefore are not averaged with other income in calculating the foreign tax credit. Royalty income
received from foreigners, including foreign affiliates of U.S. firms, is also foreign source income.
'The incentive to defer repatriation of lightly taxed subsidiary earnings is attenuated by the Subpart
F provisions, introduced in U.S. law in 1962, that treat a subsidiary's passive income, and income
invested in U.S. property, as if it were distributed to its American owners, thereby subjecting it to
immediate U.S. taxation. The Subpart F rules apply to controlled foreign corporations, which are foreign
corporations owned at least 50% by U.S. persons holding stakes of at least tO% each. Controlled foreign
corporations that reinvest their foreign earnings in active businesses can continue to defer any U.S. tax
liability on those earnings. See Hines and Rice (1994) and Scholes and Wolfson (1992) for the behavioral
implications of these rules.
9t is interesting to note that the size of the tax obligation triggered by repatriation does not itself
create an incentive to delay paying dividends from foreign subsidiaries, since the U.S. tax must be paid
eventually. See Hartman (1985).
'See the evidence presented in Hines and Hubbard (1990).
5Foreign governments oftenimposemoderate taxes on dividend, interest, and royalty payments from
foreign aftiJiates to their American parent companies; these withholding taxes are filly creditable
against an American taxpayer's U.S. tax liability on foreign income.
C. interaction of interest Expense and Foreign income Rules
American firms with foreign income are generally not permitted to deduct all of their
interestcostsinthe United Statesagainsttheir domestic taxableincomes.Instead,thelaw provides
for various methods ofallocating interestexpenses between domestic and foreignincome.The
intention of the law is to retain the full deductibility of interest expense against taxable U.S. income,
butonly for that partof interest expense generating income that is subject to U.S. taxation.
Fromthe standpoint of taxpaying firms, the U.S. taxlaw'sdistinction between
domesticand foreign interest deductions is potentiallyquiteimportant. Ifinterestexpenseis deemed
to be domestic, then it isdeductible againstthetaxpayer'sU.S. taxableincome. Alternatively, ifit is
deemed tobe foreign, then the interest expense reduces foreign taxableincomeforthepurposes of
(1.3. income taxation only.Foreigngovernments donotuse U.S.methodsof calculating interest
deductions,and generally do not permit U.S. finns to reduce their taxable incomes in foreign
countrieson the basisof interestexpenses incurred intheUnitedStates. Consequently,interest
expensesallocatedagainstforeign income arevaluable to a U.S. firm onlyifit has deficit foreigntax
credits.Ifitdoeshave deficit credits, then some of the firm's foreignincomeis subject toU.S. tax,
and anyadditional dollarofinterest expense allocated againstforeign income reduces thefirm's U.S.
taxableincomebya dollar.' With deficit foreigntax credits,firmsare indifferentbetweenallocating
'Curiously,the law is written so that the additional dollar of interest expense reducestaxable
Income without reducing the foreign taxcredits availableforforeign incometaxespaid.
6interest expenses against foreign income and allocating them against domestic income.9 If, on the
other hand, firms have excess foreign tax credits, then any interest expenses allocated against foreign
income are useless from the standpoint of reducing tax liabilities, since foreign income generates no
U.S. tax liability anyway.
TheTaxReformAct of 1986 significantlychanged U.S. tax law governing the
allocation of interest expenses. Prior to 1986, the interest expenses of U.S. taxpayers were
determined separately for each company within a controlled group.'° In principle, each company
was required to allocate interest deductions between domestic and foreign source in proportion to
domestic and foreign assets." In practice, however, this rule permitted taxpayers to structure their
linances in order to obtain a full tax deduction in the United States for interest expenses associated
with borrowing done in the United States.
Consider, for example, the situation of an American corporation that borrows $100 in
9Tbis statement, along with much of the analysis described in the paper, abstracts from the ability
of firms to carry excess foreign tax credits backward two years and forward five years. Firms that carry
excess credits forward or back may (depending on specific circumstances) face incentives that are
intermediate between those of deficit credit and excess credit firms.
'°Separate allocation of interest deductions for each company within a controlled group was firmly
established by Treasury Regulation §1.861-8, issued in 1977. Prior to 1977, US law was somewhat
vague about whether all of the companies within a controlled group should be consolidated for purposes
of interest allocation, though in an important case based on pre-1977 US law, (177' v. UnjiedStases)the
courts held that interest should be allocated on a consolidated basis.
"Taxpayers were given the alternative of allocating interest deductions on the basis of gross
domestic income and gross foreign income, though it is hard to understand why a tax-minimizing
corporation would do so, since tax-planning opportunities are so attractive using the asset method on a
single-company basis. The regulation provides that, if the income method is chosen, interest deductions
allocated against foreign-source income cannot be less than 50% of the amount that would have been
allocated against foreign-source income by the asset method. Taxpayers allocating their interest
deductions on the basis of domestic and foreign assets were required to do so based on the hook values
of those assets, unless the taxpayer elected to allocate on the basis of ftir market values, and could
demonstrate fair market values to the satisfaction of the IRS. Once chosen, taxpayers were required to
continue to use the fair market value method until granted permission by the IRS to discontinue its use.
Book values of stock (such as a parent corporation's stock in its foreign subsidiaries) were not adjusted
to include undistrihuted earnings and profits reinvested by the subsidiary corporations.
7the United States, paying interest of $10 annually. The corporation has $150 of U.S. assets and $50
of foreign assets, and earns profits of $15, gross of interest costs, in the United States, and profits of
$5 abroad. The corporation does no foreign borrowing. Under pre-1986 law, this corporation would
be entitled to deductonly $7.50 (75%of $10) of its interest charges against U.S. income, since only
75% of its assets produce U.S.-source income; the remaining $2.50 of interest deductions would be
allocated against foreign-source income. The same firm, with the same real business activities, could,
however, reorganize its affairs in a manner that would permit all of the $10 interest cost to be
deductible against U.S. income. To do so, the parent Lu-in need only borrow the $100 in the U.S.
market and then contribute the money as paid-in capital to a wholly-owned domestic subsidiary that
owns the firm's domestic and foreign operations. The domestic subsidiary pays all of its profits to its
parent as dividends. The parent firm and the domestic subsidiary file a consolidated tax return and
annual report. The domestic subsidiary has $15 of tJ.S.-source income and $5offoreign-source
income; it has no interest expenses. The parent firm has $20 of income on the basis of dividends
received from its subsidiary, and $10 of interest deductions. The parent firm is entitled to deduct all
of its interest expense against U.S. income, since the firm's assets (its wholly-owned subsidiary) are
all in the United States.12
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 significantly changed the method by which interest
deductions are allocated, specifically byintroducinga"one-taxpayerrule" in whichtheattributesof
all members of a controlled group -whetherowned directly bya parentfirm or owned bytheparent
through one or more subsidiaries -determinethe allocation of interest deductions between domestic
Prior to 1986, U.S. law did not use sophisticated look-through" rules to determine the extent
to which a U.S. corporation represents a U.S. asset. Instead, a U.S.-located subsidiary was considered
to be a U.S. asset as long as 20% or more of its gross income ftw the prior three years had U.S. source.
In the example, 75%ofthe domestic subsidiary's gross income has U.S. source.
8and foreignincome.'3 The motivationfor the taxchange was the insight that financial fungibility
impliesthat borrowing byonepart of a controlled group directly or indirectly influences the economic
activitiesof all of the group. The 1986 Act provides that the interest expenses of a U.S.taxpayer
shouldbe allocated between domestic-source and foreign-source income based on the relative assets of
the domestic and foreign operations of the controlled group. Of course, several complications attend
the implementation of such a rule.
Controlledgroupsrepresent chains of 80% or greater ownership. Consequently, an
American parentcorporationthatowns 75%ofthe voting stock of a domestic subsidiary, the other
25%of which is owned by unrelated parties, separatelyallocatesthe interest deductionsofthe parent
corporation and the domestic subsidiary. The 80% rule corresponds to the requirements for filing
consolidated tax returns and annual reports. The interestexpensesof foreign corporations are never
included within the controlled group for purposes of interest expense allocationY
Taxpayers are required to allocate interest deductions between domestic and foreign
source on the basis of the book values of assets held domestically and abroad.'3 In the cases of
subsidiaries that are 10% or more owned by members of the affiliated group, the book values of stock
held in the subsidiaries are adjusted to reflect accumulated earnings and profits of the subsidiaries.
"The changes in the interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 were
phased in over three years. Various phase-in rules apply to the interest on debt issued between1983 and
1985.
"There is an exception for financial institutions whose business is primarily with unrelated parties
and that are required by law to be operated separately from nonfinancial institutions. Such financial
institutions are not included with the rest of an affiliated group for purposes of interest allocation; instead,
the financial institutions are treated as a separate entity for purposes of interest allocation. Special rules
also apply to corporations claiming the U.S. possessions tax credit (available under §936): these
corporations are incLuded in the consolidated group for purposes of interest expenseallocation if they
otherwise meet all of the requirements for inclusion.
"Taxpayers have the alternative of using the fair market values of assets held domesticallyand
abroad, but if taxpayers do so, they are not again able to use book values without permission ofthe IRS.
9Hence, in the case of an American firm that initially finances its wholly-owned French subsidiary
with $100 of equity, and inwhich the subsidiary subsequently earns and reinvestsanadditional$400,
the parent's book value of the subsidiary is adjusted to $500forpurposes of interest expense
allocation.
The 1986 Act provides for a curious treatment of foreign assets and foreign interest
deductions by members of a controlled group. For this purpose, the gross value of U.S. assets and
the net value of foreign assets are used. This leads to something of an asymmetric treatment of
foreign and domestic borrowing for purposes of interest expense allocation. Consider, for example,
the case of a U.S.firmthat has $200 of U.S. assets, of which $150 is equity and $50 is debt
borrowed from an unrelated party; the firm also has $200 of foreign assets, of which $150 is parent
equity and $50 is debt borrowed by the subsidiary from an unrelated foreign party. The firm has
U.S-source gross income of $40, U.S. interest cost of $5. foreign-source gross income of $40, and
foreign-source interest expense of $5. This firm is required to allocate almost half of its $5 domestic
interest deduction against foreign-source income,'6 and the firm is not permitted to allocate any of its
foreign interest expense against domestic-source income, even though the leverage situation of the
foreign subsidiary is the same as the leverage situation of its American parent.
One of the consequences of the asymmetric treatment of U.S. parent firms and their
foreign subsidiaries is that the tax law can encourage firms to finance their subsidiaries with debt
from the American parent instead of parent equity or unrelated-party debt. Parent equity in foreign
subsidiaries reduces the amount of domestic interest payments allocated against U.S.-source income.
It, in the previous example, the subsidiary borrowed $50 from its parent company instead of from an
unrelated party, and the parent financed the loan to its subsidiary by borrowing an additional $50
ISThe firm has domestic assets of $200 and foreign book assets of $150. so it allocates four-
sevenths ($2004350)ofits domestic interest expense against domestic-source income, and the remaining
three-sevenths against foreign-source income.
10from unrelatedU.S. parties,thenthe subsidiary's tax positionwould notchange (it stillgetsa $5
deductionagainst taxable income in the foreign country for interest paid to its U.S. parent)," but the
parent firm receives a larger interest deduction against U.S.-source income.
The U.S. Treasury issued regulations designed to prevent U.S. firms from reacting to
the passage of the 1986 Act by financing their foreign subsidiaries with loans from U.S. parents
financed by U.S. borrowing. The first set of regulations was proposed in 1987 but never took
effect." A second set of regulations was proposed in 1988, and was temporarily in effect from that
time until 1991. Under the 1988 regulations, related-party debt influences interest allocation only if
the U.S. parent company's ratio of third-party borrowing to total assets differs significantly from its
foreign subsidiaries' (aggregate) ratio of third-party borrowing to total assets. The idea is to flag
situations in which foreign subsidiaries route their third-party borrowing through their American
parent companies. The 1988 regulation requires domestic interest expense to be allocated to foreign
source if foreign subsidiaries' aggregate ratio of third-party indebtedness to total assets is less than
80% of the third-party indebtedness of the U.S. parent company.'9 If such cases, domestic interest
"Subject to two qualifications. Certain countries (including the United States) impose thin-
capitalization" laws that limit the amount of related-party interest foreign finns can deduct from local
taxable income. In addition, countries often impose withholding taxes on cross-border interest payments;
U.S. firms with deficit foreign tax credits receive foreign tax credits for paying these taxes. Withholding
taxes on interest are usually reduced, often to zero, by bilateral tax treaties.
"The 1987 proposal was ultimately dropped due to its draconian impact on certain taxpayers with
extensive foreign operations. The 1987 proposal would have first allocated domestic interest expense
against foreign income to the extent of any related-party interest receipts from controlled foreign
corporations of the American parent company. Remaining domestic interest expense would then be
allocated between U.S. and foreign source on the basis of assets. Hence, a firm with $100 of interest
expense from borrowing by the U.S. parent in the United States, and $20 of interest receipts from its
foreign subsidiary, would first allocate $20 of its U.S. interest expense against foreign income, and
allocate the remaining $80 of interest expense between foreign and domestic sources based on relative
assets.
"The temporary regulation phased in the 80% requirement: the criterion was 50% for 1988, 65%
for 1989. and 80% for 1990 and subsequent years.
11expenses are allocated against foreign-source income until the third-party indebtednessof foreign
subsidiariesplus domestic interest expenses, allocatedinthis way, equal remaining domestic-source
third-party interest expenses.Remaining domestic interest expenses arethen allocatedbetweenU.S.
andforeignsource according to the §861-8 statute.
The interest allocation rule just described is likely to have some curious effects on the
actions of those farms that are bound by the 80% requirement. The 1988 regulations were, however,
supplanted by new regulations in 1991, and taxpayers have the option of recalculating their prior tax
liabilities using the new regulations in place of the 1988 regulations for every year that the 1988
regulations apply. At the time that the 1987 and 1988 regulations were proposed, many observers
anticipated that they would be replaced by somewhat more flexible rules that would be made
retroactively applicable. Consequently, it is unlikely that the 1988 regulations had an important effect
on arm behavior.
The 1991 regulations compare current-year behavior of U.S. parent companies to their
behavior over 5-year 'base periods." Specifically, the regulations provide that domestic interest
expense deductions are allocated against foreign source income if both(i)third-party indebtedness of
the U.S. parent and (ii) lending by the U.S. parent to its foreign subsidiaries exceed base levels
(adjusted tbr acquisitions, dispositions, and changes in amounts of assets). Various exceptions apply
to firms for whom the adjustment would be a small matter, and firms that experience large year-to-
year changes in their borrowing behavior. Once this intrafirm interest expense allocation is complete.
remaining domestic interest expenses are allocated to foreign source based on the §861-8 statute.
Given the complexity of the 1991 regulation, and the important role it gives to a 6rm's pat behavior,
it appears that the incentives it creates can be very firm-specific. In what follows, firms are assumed
not to be bound by the base-period ratio tests.
There are exceptions to the allocation rules introduced in the 1986 Act. One
12exception concerns intereston certainnon-recoursedebt.Taxpayers are permitted to allocateallof
their interest expenses against income derived from property acquired using non-recourse debt,
subjecttovarious restrictions. Consequently, an American multinational that finances a $100
domestic invesunentwith $60 of equityand $40 ofnon-recoursedebtis entitled todeductthe interest
expensesgenerated by the $40 debt from the income flow of the $100 investment in calculating its
taxable income. There is a second exception in which nonfinancial firms are permitted to deduct
interest expenses on debt used to purchase interest-bearing securities against the interest income from
those securities, again subject to certain restrictions.
D.Incentives Creased By The TaxRules
The upshot of the rules just described is that firms with excess foreign tax credits and
substantialforeign assets(as a fraction of total assets)could nolongerenjoy the benefitsoffull
deductibilityof interest expenses incurredinthe United States after 1986. Firms with deficitforeign
taxcredits, or those with no foreign assets, retain full benefits of interest expense deductibility. As a
consequence, firms in the first category can be expected to reduce their borrowing relative to firms in
the second, and can also be expected to reduce the volume of their debt-financed investment
activity.2'
The use of non-recourse debt in a situation like this one offers a tax advantage, but is costly in
that lenders typically.require higher interest rates to compensate for the additional risks they bear due to
the non-recourse nature of the debt.
21Three other studies examine the impact of interest allocation rules on the behavior of impacted
firms. Collins and Shackelford (1992) find that firms with large ratios of foreign to domestic assets are
more likely than other firms to issue preferred stock (as a substitute for debt) in the period after 1986.
Collins and Shackelford do not, however, distinguish excess foreign tax credit firms from deficit foreign
tax credit finns. Altshuler and Mintz (1994) analyze the borrowing patterns of a sample of eight
multinational firms, finding that firms that are unable to claim full tax deductions for interest payments
in the United States are more likely to borrow abroad than to borrow in the United States. Froot and
Hines (1994) examine the effect of interest allocation rules on the financing patterns of firms as they
grow, finding that the tax change discouraged some firms from adding new assets to their balancesheets.
13in order to analyze more carefullytheincentives created by changesin theU.S.tax
treatmentof interestdeductions, itis helpful to examinefirm behaviorwithin a verystylized model.
Weassumethat an Americanfirm's domestic profitsafter depreciationand other expenses(but before
interest charges) is Q(A), in which A represents domestic assets. Foreignprofitsafter depreciation
and other expenses including interest charges on foreign borrowing is Q'(A5), in which A represents
foreign assets net of foreign borrowing. Domestic assets have two components: equity (E) anddebt
(D), so A = E+D. Theinterestrate on domestic borrowing isr,the domestic corporatetax rateis
r, and the foreign tax rate is r. Firms are assumed to repatriate their foreign after-tax profits as
earned, and the foreign withholding tax rate on dividend repatriations is assumed to be zero.
We use a as an indicator variable that takes the value I if the firm has excess foreign
tax credits (in this model, a = I if rt > r), and 0 if the firm has deficit foreign tax credits. A firm
is required to allocate domestic interest deductions of rD[A1(A+A')) against foreign-source income.
Firms with deficit foreign tax credits are unaffected by this requirement, while the after-tax profits of
firms with excess foreign tax credits are reduced by the product of this amount and the statutory U.S.
tax rate. The foreign operations of firms with deficit foreign tax credits are effectively taxed at the
U.S. tax rate, while the foreign operations of firms with excess foreign tax credits are effectively
taxed at foreign tax rates.
Firms are assumed to maximize total after-tax profits, which equal:
Profits = [Q(E+D) - rD](1-r) - anD[A*I(E+D+M)] + Q'(A)tl - at' - (I-a)r] - XA(I)
in which X is the shadow cost of resources devoted to foreign operations. Consider first the behavior
of firms with excess foreign tax credits. Setting a = 1, and solving for an interior maximum of (I)
over the choice of D, yields:
14Q'(A) = r + rrA(E+At)/I(l-r)(E+D+A5)2] (2)
Solving for an interior maximum of (1) over the choice of As yields:
Q'(A = X+rrD(E+D)f[(lr)(E+D+A*)1 (3)
Bycontrast, the first-order conditions that characterize the behavior of firms with deficit foreign tax
credits(a =0)are:
Q'(A) = r (4)
Q*r(A*) = A (5)
Examination of equations (2) - (5) indicates that the interest allocation rules raise the
required marginal product of debt-financed domestic and foreign capital for firms with excess foreign
tax credits. The degree to which required marginal products are raised depends, in part, on terms
that include ratios of domestic indebtedness and domestic assets to the square of total assets. The
squared terms appear due to the conflicting effects of interest allocation on the demand for domestic
and foreign assets. Interest allocation raises the after-tax cost of marginal debt used to finance the
domestic operations of tirms with excess foreign tax credits. At the same time, interest allocation
encourages firms with excess foreign tax credits to expand their domestic operations in order to
allocate as much as possible of their inframarginal domestic interest expense against U.S.-source
income. The combination of these two effects attenuates, but does not eliminate, the direct effect of
interest allocation on the demand for domestic assets. Interest allocation raises the required marginal
15product of foreign capital through its effect on the allocation of inframarginal interest expenses for
firms with excess foreign tax credits.
One complication that arises in using (2)-(5) to estimate the effect of interest allocation
rules on firm behavior after 1986 is that foreign and domestic asset levels are themselves endogenous
to the tax changes under consideration. We treat this problem by using 1986 levels of (At/(A+At)I
in the regressions as proxies for contemporaneous foreign asset fractions. Since foreign asset
fractions did not influence the allocation of interest deductions iii 1986, the 1986 level of this variable
is arguably exogenous to the change in behavior induced by. the tax change. Of course, more
sophisticated treatments are possible, such as instrumenting for contemporaneous foreign asset
fractions with the 1986 fraction, or parameterizing the model to include endogenously the tax-induced
changes in the fraction of foreign and domestic assets. One of the difficulties that such investigations
encounter is that available data are sketchy, and in particular, that asset and foreign tax credit
information does not correspond exactly to definitions that apply for tax purposes. In addition, richer
models thatincorporatepossible substitutability or complementarity of domestic and foreign assets are
likely to suggest subtle variants of theproceduredescribed above. Given thelimitationsinherent in
using publicly-available data, we proceed to analyze simple specifications of the relationships implied
by (2)-(5).
Ill.Dataand Preliminary Results
Weuse information reported by Compustat on the balance-sheet items of large
publicly-traded corporations. Compustat currently provides information on somewhat more than
7,500 companies. We select only multinational firms incorporated in the United States: firms are
included if their reported foreign assets equal I % or more of reported total assets for each year 1986-
1990. 422 firms satisfy this criterion.
16Foreign tax rate information is central to our analysis, since the hypothesis that firms
maximize after-tn profits implies that deficit foreign tax credit firms will react quite differently to the
Tax Reform Act of 1986 than will excess foreign tax credit firms. We construct foreign tax rates as
the ratio of foreign income taxes paid to foreign pre-tax income as reported by Compustat. This
variable is somewhat noisy, but is likelytocapture the major differences between the foreign tax rates
facing different firms. In order to attenuate some of the difficulties that accompany annual
measurements of the foreign tax rate variable, firms were classified into excess foreign tax credit
status based on five years of data, 1986-1990. Firms for which the average foreign tax rate over that
period exceeds the contemporaneous average U.S. statutory corporate tax rate are classified as excess
foreign tax credit firms; all other finns are classified as deficit foreign tax credit firms? From our
initial sampleof422 firms, six additional firms were excluded, five due to insufficient tax rate
infonnation, and one to major ownership changes over the 1986-1991 time period?' Thus the total
sample is 416 firms Hand checking of the Compustat data led to the correction of two errors?
Mergers and other dramatic business events can complicate the interpretation of
rThe introduction of the new interest allocation rules in 1986,alongwith other tax changes, gave
some firms incentives to adjust the location and tax-avoiding behavior of their foreign affiliates. In the
analysis that follows we take foreign tax rates to be exogenous to US tax changes. Endogenizing foreign
tax rates could change the interpretation of the magnitude of the estimated coefficients.
This classification of the foreign tax credit status of the firms in the sample is necessarily
somewhat imprecise. The same firm may have excess foreign tax credits in one year and deficit foreign
tax credits in another; furthermore, excess foreign tax credits may be carried forward five years or back
two years. A firm's foreign tax credit status can be endogenous to discretionary decisions such as
dividend repatriation choices. The regressions reported in the tables were all re-run replacing the zero-
one foreign tax credit status with a continuous tax rate variable constructed as the average difference
between foreign and U.S. tax rates. The results are similar to those reported in the tables.
'Coltec Industries was taken private in 1988, and completed an IPO in early 1992.
Compustat reports that Alpnet's foreign asset to total asset ratio was 1.25 in 1988, while the
tirm's annual report implies that the ratio is 0.789; we use the latter figure. Compustat reports a jump
in IBM's foreign asset to total asset ratio from 0.48 in 1990 to 0.98 in 1991. IBM's annual report
indicates that the 1991 ratio was 0.469, which is the figure we use.
17changes in the behavior of firms over the sampleperiod. In theprocess of merging, finns can exhibit
largechangesinamountsof debt outstanding, ownership of property, plant, and equipment, and other
variablesthatserve as indicatorsof reactions to changes in the interest allocationrules.One
consequenceisthatananalystmightattribute some of these operational changestotax incentives
introduced by the 1986 Act, when, in reality, the changes are the results of merger decisions that
were uninfluenced by the 1986 Act. Alternatively, the 1986 Act might be responsible for important
changesin capital structure or business operations, but thesechanges could be swampedbythe effects
ofmergers.
These difficulties notwithstanding, it is important to bearinmind thatmergingfirms
face the same taxincentivesas do firms that do not merge. One interpretation ofthe potential
problemintroduced by mergers is that firm-specific attributes captured by the constant term used in
panel estimation may not remain constant for firms that merge. At the same time, merging firms may
provide the clearest indication of the behavioral responsesto thetax change, since firms undergoing
mergers often simultaneously reexamine their capital structures, their needs for domestic and foreign
assets, and other considerations that nonmerging firms may address only sporadically.
Weaddress the problem of mergers by repeating our estimation on three data sets.
Thefirstis the universeof416firmsdescribedabove. A second dataset of 388firmsexcludesany
firmsthatrecord a 100%or greater change in assetsin oneyear. Theideais thatfirms withgreater
than 100% changes in assets very likely experience substantial mergers that change the character of
their businessdecisions.The third data set, consisting of 331 firms, uses a more restrictive threshold
of 50% changes of assets. Due to space limitations, wedonot reportbelowall of the results using
the three data sets; instead,wereport results forthelargest available data set, while noting any
importantdifferences in the results thatappearusing themorerestricted samples.
Weuse firm-level information available throughCompustatto calculatechangesover
18the 19841991timeperiod in: debt,capitalin place, foreign assets, costs of goods sold,foreignsales
net of intrafirm exports, taxes paid, and pretax income. Changes in debt are measured as the
difference between the book values of total debt (long-term and current) in 1991 and total debt in
1986. Changes in capital are measured as the difference between net property, plant and equipment
in 1991 and net property, plant, and equipment in 1986. Foreign assets are measured as total foreign
assetsin 1986, wdtheratioofthisvlewtotalassl98óisusednoconiytocontrolfortlsm
characteristics (degree of multinationality) but as a component of the cost of debt finance after 1986.
In some of the regressions, we use tax loss carry forwards (TLCF). Tax loss carryforwards are
measured (for those firms reporting it) using 1986 data only?' We use 1986 levels of TLCF due to
the potential endogeneity of TLCF over the 1986-91 period (since tax losses can be generated by
rapid debt accumulation). Table I presents means and standard deviations of variables used in the
regressions.
Theempiricalstrategyis touse the identifyingassumption that foreigntaxcredit
statusinfluences operational changesbetween 1986-1991only through itseffect, viainterest allocation
rules, on the cost of borrowing.Of course, differences in foreigntax credit status could reflect firm
heterogeneity that is(forsome reason) relatedin anontax manner to operational changes over 1986-
1991. Weattemptto control for firm heterogeneity in two ways. First, we use ratios of foreign
assets to total assets, TLCFs, and industry dummies to allow for industry- and firm-specific effects
that may be correlated with foreign tax credit status. Second, we use firm behavior over the 1984-86
period as a control for behavior from 1986.1991. If the results are driven by the 1986 tax change,
foreign tax credit status should have no ability to explain changes in debt, assets, foreign operations,
and other variables over the 198446 period. Alternatively, if the results are driven by omitted firm-
1nformation on tax loss carryforwards in 1986 is missing for 29 of the firms in the sample of 416;
these firms were dropped from the sample in specifications using TLCF as an explanatory variable.
19specific factors that are constant over 1984-1991andcorrelated with the 1986 tax variables, then
results for the pre-reform (1984-86) and post-reform (1986-91) periods should look similar.
IV. Regression results
This section describes the results of regressions that estimate the effects of the changes
in interest allocation rules on firm financing and operational patterns. The null hypothesis is that the
changes in interest allocation rules had no impact on firm behavior; this hypothesis implies that firms
simply bear the tax cost of the 1986 Act. We contrast this null hypothesis with two alternative
hypotheses: (1) that firms respond to the tax changes by using non-debt financing, and (11) that firms
respond to the tax changes by reducing their foreign operations?
We examine these alternatives by constructing independent variables that distinguish
firms by their exposures to the tax change as of 1986. Firms with excess Ibreign tax credits and high
ratios of foreign to domestic assets are the ones that are least able to take deductions against their
U.S. tax liabilities for domestic interest payments. The foreign tax credit status dummy variable
(described above) is a simple measure of firm exposure to the change in the interest allocation rules.
It is possible to obtain more precision by measuring interaction effects. For example, we use the
squared ratio of foreign assets to total assets, interacted with the foreign tax credit dummy variable, to
21The null and alternative hypotheses correspond to different theoretical specifications of the ease with
which firms can adjust their financial and operating patterns. Stiglitz (1973) argues that the tax advantage
to debt makes borrowing a firm's preferred method of financing marginal investments. If this argument
is correct, and firms continue to prefer debt to other financing methods even after some of its tax
advantages are lost due to the interest allocation rules, then firms will not react to the tax changes by
substituting other financing methods for debt, but will react by reducing the size of foreign and total
operations. Alternatively, the Miller (1977) model of financial equilibrium implies that firms impacted
by the interest allocation rules will change their capital structure to pure equity finance. As long as the
capitalization of the affected firms does not exceed the initial amount of equity on the market, this type
of financial arbitrage implies that the interest allocation rules will not affect the capital costs, or real
operations, of any firms. Gordon and Malkiel (1981) examine a model in which debt is tax-preferred
but its use raises the probability that a firm will incur costs associated with bankruptcy; this model carries
implications between those of the Stiglitz and Miller models.
20detect differences in firmbehaviorbased onforeign tax credit status,given theratio of assetsabroad.
Accordingto the model, excess foreign tax credit finns ought to show greater behavioral responses
the higher are their ratios of foreign to total assets. We also control for other firm characteristics
that might be correlated with firm responses, such as growth over the sample period, industry, and
presence and amount of tax loss carryforwards.
We choose dependent variables to identify changes in: (i) firm capital structure; (ii)
investment spending; (iii) lease commitments; and (iv) foreign operating levels. These variables are
chosen because of their relationships with the alternative hypotheses. For example, alternative
hypothesis (I) implies that firms can costlessly substitute away from higher-priced debt toward other
financial vehicles; this behavioral response should appear as a change in capital structure. In
addition, investment spending would tend to fall and leasing to increase in excess foreign tax credit
firms,asthey take assets off their balance sheets through leasing. Finally, hypothesis (I) implies
that foreignoperatinglevelsshouldnot change in responsetothe 1986Act,sincemanagersfinance
costlessly around thetax change.
Ifalternative hypothesis(H)iscorrect, substitute financial vehicles are not perfect,
and consequently,the taxchangeraises thecostofcapital incertainbusinesses. Thisincreasein
costs may encouragefirmsto cut backon their operations.We also mightexpect someeffect on
financingmethods, as firmssubstitute away fromdebtand toward leasing.However, we wouldalso
expecta declinein investmentandforeignoperations, measuredby foreign-produced foreign sales, or
evenby firm-wide costs of goods sold.
"Operatingleases(to which we refer)arenot included on the balance sheet, and theassociatedlease
paymentsarefully deductibleagainst U.S. taxableincome.Capital leases ontheother hand, are
included on the balance sheet, and their associated lease paymentsare(as is true ofdebt)alloced fortax
purposes between domestic and foreignsourcesby §861-8. We use measuresofinvestment that include
changes in capital leases but not in operating leases, and it is operating leases that are preferred by firms
unable to take full advantage of lease tax deductions. See, for example, Smith and Wakeman (1984) and
Edwards and Mayer (1991).
21If the null hypothesis is correct, then firms do little to changetheir financing or
operatingpatterns; instead, they simplybearthe additional burden created bythe taxchange. If this
is the case, then changes in capital structure, leasing, investment, foreign operations, and firm-wide
operations need bear no relation to firms' exposures to the interest allocation provisions of the 1986
Act. However, one would expect to observe an increase in totalcosts(and a decline in after-tax
profits) that reflects the additional tax burden.
A. A Nonparwnetric Look at the Sample
Table 2 describes some aspects of the behavior of the sample of firms after l986.
Firms are classified into two groups on the basis of fraction of foreign assets (above median and
below median); within group, they are further classified by excess foreign tax credit and deficit
foreign tax credit status. Roughly half of the firms in the sample (51.4%) are classified as having
excess foreign tax credits.
Firms that differ in the fraction of their assets held abroad may differ in other
important observable and unobservable ways. The model presented in section 2 implies that the 1986
Act raised the cost of debt-financed investments for firms with excess foreign tax credits and
significant foreign assets. The behavior described in Table 2 is consistent with the predictions of the
alternative hypotheses. Firms with excess foreign tax credits exhibit slower mean growth (from 1986-
1991) of outstanding debt relative to 1986 assets, and slower mean growth ofproperty, plant, and
equipment, than do deficit credit firms. This pattern appears for multinational firms with small
fractions of foreign assets (except for a negligible difference in debt changes forexcess and deficit
foreign tax credit firms with small amounts of foreign assets), but is considerably more dramatic for
2'Fables 2-3 describe the behavior of the sample of 388 firms that did not exhibit 100%or greater
change in assets in a year. The larger sample of 416 firms has moments that arevery similar to those
reported in Tables 2-3.
22firms withhighfractionsof foreign assets.
Figure 1 illustrates the mean growth of debt relative to 1986 asset levels for firms in
each cell reported in Table 2. The figure suggests that excess foreign tax credits affect only those
firms with significant foreign assets, which is consistent with the theory sketched in section 2.
Furthermore, there is a marked difference between the cumulative growth of debt in excess foreign
taxcredit firms andthat in deficit foreign tax credit firms. A similar pattern appears in finns'
accumulationofproperty,plantand equipment, as illustrated by Figure2.This figure indicates that
theimpact of excess foreign taxcreditson the accumulation of property, plant, andequipmentismost
dramatic for firms with significant foreign assetsas afraction of total assets.
Alternative hypothesis (I)indicatesthat firms react to higherafter-taxcosts of debt by
replacingdebtwithalternative financing devices.Earlierwork byCollins and Shackelford(1992)
calls attention to the impact of changesininterest allocation ruleson firms' proclivitiesto issue
preferred stock. Onlyasmall fraction of firms are financed with preferred stock, but theyargue that
theuseofpreferred stockexpandedafter 1986 due, in part, totherising after-tax cost ofdebt.
Table 3 describes the responses of firms in our sample to the changingincentivesto
issue preferred stock after1986. Themean behavior offinnsas reported in the tableisnotconsistent
with the hypothesis that tax considerations were responsible for a significant shift of financing away
from debt and into preferred stock. The absence of an important effect in the means may reflect the
omission of important variables that explain preferred stock issuances, or may simply reflect the
smallness of the fraction of the sample that ever issues preferred stock. One tidbit of evidence
presented in Table 3 is consistent with the theory of tax-motivated preferred stock issuances: excess
3°Collins and Shackelford (1992) include a number of additional explanatory variables in their
regressions. Many of these additional variables, such as net operating loss status, are likely to influence
preferred stock issuances, but most financial and operating variables are themselves endogenous to
financing choices and may respond to unobservables that also influence financing decisions.
23foreign tax credit status is positively correlated withthe fractionof high-foreign-asset firmsthat
increasetheir outstanding preferred stock after1986, andnegativelycorrelated with the fraction of
high-foreign-assetfirms that decrease their outstanding preferred stock after 1986.The reverse
pattern appears for tow-foreign-assetfinns. Given the very smallsizeof the sample of firms
changingtheir preferred stock amounts, however, these correlations are no morethan suggestive.
B. CapioJ Structureand Changes in Borrowing Patterns
Tables4a-b report regressions of changes in capital structure, measured as the change
indebt divided by beginning-of-period assets. The sample periodused in theregressions reported in
Table 4a is the 1986-1991 period, whereas the sample period used in the regressions reportedin
Table 4b is 1984-1986. All regressions areOLS.
ThefirstspecificationinTable 4a regressesthechange in debt from 1986 to 1991
(scaledby assetsin1986) on a constantand theforeign tax credit status dummy. The coefficient on
thedummy term is negativeas expected; however, itisnot statistically significant. A more precise
specificationis that excess foreign tax credit firms should exhibit greater aversion to using debt the
higher are their ratios of foreign to total assets. The second regressionin Table 4a tests this
specification, by including both the (squared) ratio of foreign to total assets and aninteraction term
between this ratio and the foreign tax credit status dummy. Here, the coefficient of.0.64 on the
interaction term indicates that a firm with excess foreign tax credits and half of its assetsabroad
reduces its debt accumulation by 16% [-0.64(1/2)1 of assets over 5 years, or about 3% per year.
Thiscoefficienton the interaction term becomes largerandmoresignificant when(as
in the regressions reported in column 3) tax loss carry forwards (TLCF) are included as an
explanatory variable. The introduction of industry dummy variables,intended to capture differential
pressure on debt accumulation across industries, also raisesthe magnitude of the estimated coefficient
24that reflects the impact of interest allocation rules.Inthe specificationreportedin column 5, one that
includesbothTLCF and industry dummies, the estimatedcoefficient onthe interaction term is -0.96.
This implies that the interest allocation rules encourage a firmwith excess foreign tax credits and half
of its assets abroad to reduce debt accumulation at anannual rate of 4.8 (-0.96(1/2)/51 percent of
initial assets.
Table 4b reports estimated coefficients from regressions that repeat the same 5
specificationsas those reported in Table 4a, except that the dependentvariableisnow the changein
debt prior tothetax-law change(1984-1986).lithe results inTable4a aredrivenbyunobserved,
time-invariant,andtirm-specific factors that are correlatedwith included taxvariables,we would
expect to find the resultsreported in Table 4b to resemble thosein Table 4a. Note,however, that
this is not the case: the estimated coefficients on allofthe explanatory variables(except TLCF)
changesignand becomeinsignificant. Thus,Table 4b offers littlesupportfor the hypothesisthat
firm-specific unobservables areresponsibleforthe results reported in Table 4a.'1 A better
interpretationof the resultsof Tables 4aand4b is that excess foreigntaxcreditfirmstendto
substituteaway from debt finance. Asexpected,thisappearsto be particularly true forfirms with
largerratios of foreign-to-total assets.
Table 5a presents estimated coefficients from regressions that examine changesin
property, plant,and equipment(PPE) from 1986 to 1991, scaled by 1986 assets. Right-handside
specifications are similar to those used in Table 4a. The first specificationreported in Table Sa shows
that investment rates differ by foreign tax credit status. While the coefficient onthe foreign tax
credit dummy variable is statistically negative, it is relatively small: excess foreigntax credit firms
invest at rates that are about 1.5% [-0.074/51 lower per year. Note that, as before,the effect
31We ran the specifications presented in Tables 4a-4b for two smaller data samplesthat filter out those
firms with year-on-year changes in assets of 100 and 50 precent, findingresults that are similar to those
above. However, in some cases the statistical significance of the parameterestimates was reduced.
25becomes larger when interacted with the ratio of foreign-to-total assets. For example,the second
specification reportsaninteractioncoefficient of -0.56,implying thatanexcessforeigntax creditfirm
with half its assets abroad invests at an annual rateof 2.8% ((O.56*(l/2)2)/5] lower than a
comparabledeficit foreign tax credit firm.'3 When industry dummies and tax loss carryforwards are
added to the specification, the coefficient increases in magnitude, reaching -0.69 in the specification
reported in column 5. The same regressions, when run using data on PPE accumulation over the
1984-1986 timeperiod,produce estimated interaction coefficients that are positive rather than
negative (though not significantly different from zero). Table 55 presents estimated coefficients from
these regressions.
Therearetwopossibleinterpretations of the tendency for firms with excess foreign
tax credits and high ratiosoftbreigntototal assets to accumulate PPE more slowly than do other
firms. The firstisthatthe loss of debttax shields experienced by these firms results in a higher
overall cost of capital,and, consequently,alower level ofinvestment. Ofcourse, to the extentthat
firms substitute awayfrom debtfinance toward cheaper after-tax financing sources, these substitutions
can mitigatethe increasedcost of capital.The secondinterpretationisthat firms donotface any
increasein thecost of employingcapital, but that they reduce PPE expenditures by leasing rather than
owningcapita].Leases allowthe leasor to usethedebttax shield from debt financingof PPE, since
thecapital costcomponent oflease pricesisnot allocated between foreign and domestic source.
Thus,leases may represent low-cost devices to preserve the tax shield for givenamountof PPE. This
suggests that excess threign tax credit firms — particularly those with higher foreign asset ratios — had
incentives to expand more rapidly the use of leases than did deficit foreign tax credit firms.
Table 6a reports our attempts to test this latter interpretation. We regress a measure
of unexpectedincreasesin lease committments over the 1986-91 period on the same explanatory
"As above, percentage figures are expressed relative to beginning-of-period assets.
26variables usedin earlier regressions. The dependent variable is unexpected increases in leases
because that variable measures the differential effect of the 1986 tax act. It is unlikelythatthe
interest allocation rules enacted at the end of 1986 were understood in detail in prior to that year. In
any case, to the extent that such changes were anticiaptaed, the power of our tests is reduced. In
order to measure unexpected increases in lease committments, the numerator of the dependent
variable equals the difference between actual lease payments in each year from 1986 to 1990 and the
five year lease committments as of December 1985. This difference is scaled by 1986 assets. Table
6a reports the results from regressing this measure on right-hand side variables similar to those in
previous tables.
The first specification uses only the foreign tax credit dummy variable, finding there
to be a small difference between excess foreign tax credit and deficit foreign tax credit firms.
Similarly, both the foreign asset ratio and interaction term are statistically insignificant when added to
the regression (as reported in column 2). One possibility is that the colinearity between these two
terms, particularly the collinearity introduced by errors in measurement of the ratio of foreign assets
to total assets, is responsible for the insignificance of individual coefficients. Column 3 reports
estimated coefficients from specifications that omit the foreign-to-total-assets ratio term. Omitting this
ratio imposes the restriction that there is no relationship between foreign assets and leases among
deficit foreign tax credit firms. This restriction cannot be rejected by the data, since the estimated
coefficient on the ratio of foreign assets in the specification reported in column 2 is statistically
indistinguishable from zero.
The estimates presented in column 3 indicate that the interaction-term coefficient
increases in magnitude and becomes statistically significant once the asset ratio restriction is imposed.
The interaction coefficient reported in column 3 implies that, among excess foreign tax credit firms, a
50 percent difference in the fraction of total assets that are foreign-held is associated with an average
27difference in unexpected leases over five years of 25% [1.00(112)9 of assets, or about 5% per year.
The estimated coefficient on the interaction term is also large and marginally
significant when the simple foreigntaxcredit status dummy variable is added (as in the specification
reported in column 4). These results therefore suggest that deficit foreign taxcredit firms on average
do more leasing than excess foreign tax credit firms (the reverse of what one might expect); however,
excess foreign tax credit firms with larger ratios of assets held abroad show a stronger tendencyto
lease. Overall, Table 6a provides some evidence that excess foreign tax credit firms with high ratios
of assets abroad tend to engage in additional, unexpected leasing subsequent to 1986. Table ôb
reports estimated coefficients from identical regressions that include industry dummy variables;the
results are similar, though of lower statistical significance.
To the extent that firms increase their leasing to avoid higher debt costs for on-
balance-sheet assets, they are able to mitigate tax-induced changes in financing costs. The results
reported in Table 6a therefore provide some support for alternative hypothesis (1), although they by
no means rule out hypothesis (II). Indeed, the evidence presented in Tables 4a-6b suggests that
financing responses did occur, but not that operating responses didnot occur.Thus, there appears to
be evidence against the null hypothesis, and some evidence in favor of hypothesis (I), but one cannot
rule out hypthesis (II).
C.Changes in Operating Patterns
Oneway to obtain additional evidence on hypotheses (1) and (11) is to investigatethe
level of firms' foreign operations. For example, by examining changes in foreign sales, and foreign
costs of production (with and without financing costs), one might gain a better sense for whether
excess foreign tax credit firms changed their operations as a result of higher capital costs.
Unfortunately, relatively little data on firms' foreign operations is available. In this section we use
28different measures of operations, although in some cases we are forced to employ data that combine
foreign and domestic operating information.
The first variablethatmeasures changes foreign operations is foreign-produced
foreign sales. This variable is the difference between sales by foreign affiliates and intrafirm exports
from the United States. This variable identifies firms that avoid higher capital costs by substituting
away from foreign assets toward domestic assets, as reflected by a proclivity to service foreign
markets by exporting rather than using local production.
Tables 7a and 7b report estimated coefficients from regressions that use foreign-
produced foreign sales as the dependent variable. In the regressions reported in Table 7a, the
independent variables are similar to those presented in Tables 4a-6b, with the difference that
debt/assets is used as a regressor in Table 7a place of foreign assets/total assets. The reason for this
substitution is that the margin of substitution tested in these regressions is one in which greater
indebtedness raises the cost of each dollar of foreign assets, and not one in which the foreign asset
ratio is appropriately held constant. If the tax change induces operating effects, the reason must be
that firms find it costly to substitute away from debt financing. Thus, excess foreign tax credit firms
with high levels of debt in 1986 will not, in these instances, be able inexpensively to reconsitute their
capital strucutures, and thus are more likely to reduce their foreign-produced foreign sales.
The first specification reported in Table 7a indicates that excess foreign tax credit
firms on average reduce foreign-produced foreign sales by about 5.7 percent ova five years relative
to deficit firms; this effect is not, however, statistically different from zero. Column 2 reports
estimated coefficients from a more precise specification in which the foreign tax credit dununy
variable is interacted with the ratio of debt to total assets. The estimated coefficient on this
interaction term is significant, and indicates that firms with excess foreign tax credits and 25%debt-
to-asset ratios reduced their foreign sales by 2% a year (relative to assets) after 1986. Columns 3-S
29of Table 7a report the results of alternative specifications in which the estimated interaction effect
remains negative whileexhibiting reducedstatistical significance.
Table 7b presents similar regressions that include an addition variable conditioning on
the amount of debt in the capital structure as of 1986. The results are similar to those presented in
Table 7a. Together, the results reported in Tables 7a and 7b provide mild support for hypothesis II
above, i.e., that firms responded to the tax change by cutting back on their foreign operations instead
ol filly absorbing the increase in capital costs.
One logical implication of the preceding analysis is that the interest allocation rules,
by raising the cost of domestic operations and raising the cost of foreign operations, depress the level
of total business operations by impacted firms. Since the magnitude of total business operations is
influenced by runny important nontax factors, and, as a practical matter, can be measured in more
than one way, this is a challenging hypothesis to test.
Table Sa presents estimated coefficients from regressions in which the dependent
variables are changes in costs of goods sold between 1986 and 1991 (scaled by assets in 1986). The
cost of goods sold variable includes foreign and domestic costs. In order to simplify matters, the
independent variables are the same as those used in the regressions reported in Table 4a. Table 8a
indicates that the tax effects take the expected negative sign -firmsaffected by the interest allocation
rules reduced the scales of their operations -butthe estimated coefficients are insignificant in every
case. The statistical insiginificance of the coefficients no doubt reflects, at least in part, the
impossibility of controlling for many important factors that influence changes in costs of goods sold
over this period. The evidence is certainly consistent with a sizable impact of interest allocation rules
on scales of operation (the point estimate in the regression reported in column 3 of Table 8a implies
that costs of goods sold were reduced by 2%Iyear,relativeto assets, for affected firms with 25%
foreign assets), but it is not possible to reject the hypothesis that there was no impact on operations.
30Table Sb presents the results of specifications that repeatthis estimation, takingas the
dependent variable changes in costs of goods sold over 1984-1986. Again,the tax terms are
insignificant,though they are of opposite sign to those reported in Table Ba. Takentogether,the
regressions reported in Tables 8a and Sb provide suggestive but inconclusive (from a statistical
standpoint) evidence that interest allocation rules may influence the overall magnitude of firm
operations.
V. Condusion
This paper examines the impact of interest allocation rules introduced by the Tax
Reform Act of 1986. The incomplete tax deductibility of parent-company interest expenses appears to
reduce significantly borrowing and investing by excess foreign tax credit firms. In addition, excess
foreign tax credit firms affected by the interest allocation rulesarethe most likely to undertake new
operating leases, presumably in lieu of acquiring new capital. These results are consistent with the
hypothesis that firms substitute away from debt when it becomes more expensive, as well as the
hypothesis that loss of interest tax deductibility can increase a firm's cost of capital.
Note, however, that the size and significance of the effects on borrowing, investment
spending and leasing do not imply that interest allocation rules necessarily impose large costs on
excess foreign tax credit firms. All of the results justmentionedmight appeareventhough non-debt
financing substitutes are available at essentially the same cost as debt finance. If, for example,
leasing can be done at the same after-tax cost as buying, then the tax law change may just encourage
low-cost substitution.
Of' course, many of the results are also consistent with the proposition that excess
fo reign tax credit firms face relatively greater costs of capital. Finns may choose to fund property.
plant, and equipment off the balance sheet as a way of capturing pan of the otherwise-lost tax shields.
31The portion that cannot be captured is a real cost. This may lead excess foreign tax credit firms to
underinvest, to grow more slowly, and to restrict the scope of foreign operations; this behavior, in
turn, reduces their needs for debtfinancing.Some of the results reported in the paper suggest that
firms affected by the change in interest allocation rules reduced their foreign and total operations in
response. The tax law change may also skew investments by affected finns away from businessesin
which the tax deductions are crucial to be competitive. In this way, the loss of U.S. multinational tax
shields could represent substantial firm-specific costs.
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Note: Bars measure the ratios of5-yearchanges (1986-1991) inbookvalues of debt to 1986 book
assets. Entries dq,ict the mean ratio for firms In each cell. 193 firms had below-median ratios of
foreign assets to total assets In 1986, of which 91 were classified as having excess foreign tax credits
and96 were classified as havingdeficitforeign tax credits. 193 firms had above-median ratios of
foreign assets to total assets, ofwhich92wereclassified as havingexcessforeign tax credits, and 101












Note: Bars measure the ratios of 5-year changes (1986-1991) in book values of property, plant, and
equipmentto 1986 bookassets. Entries depict the mean ratioforfirms in each ccli. 193 farms had
below-median ratios of foreign assets to total assets in 1986, of which 91 were classified as having
excess foreign tax credits and 96 were classified as having deficit foreign tax credits. 193 firms had
above-median ratios of foreign assets to total assets, of which 92 were classified as having excess
foreign tax credits, and lOt as having deficit foreign tax credits.
ExcessDeficit ExcessDeficit
Fits FTCs FTCsFTCsTable I
VariableMeansandStandard Deviations
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Debt 1986-1991/Assets 1986 0.2089 0.4566 416
Debt 1984-1986/Assets 1986 0.1341 0.5254 386
X PPE 1986-1991/Assets 1986 0.2003 0.3903 414
PPE 1984-1986/Assets1986 0.0874 0.2024 385
New Leases, 1986-1991/Assets19860.43 15 0.8298 286
. ForeignSales/Assets1986 0.3114 0.7089 409
Cost 1986-1991/Assets 1986 0.5051 0.9709 416
Cost 1984-1986/Assets 1986 0. 1750 0.8093 385
FTC dummy 0.4808 0.5002 416
IA*/(A+A*)12 0.0836 0.1104 416
FTC dummy [At/(A+A*)Jz 0.0400 0.0930 416
Tax Loss Carry/Assets 0S487 0.2432 387
Debt/Assets, 1986 0.2373 0.1887 416
FTC dummy (Debt/Assets] 0.1132 0.1705 416
Note: Debt represents the book value of total (domestic plus foreign) debt. Assets 1986 represents
the book value of total assets at yearend 1986. PPE is the book value of property, plant and
equipment. New Leases represents the difference between actual lease expenditures and long-term
commitments at the start of the period.Foreign Sales represents foreign-produced foreign sales
over the 1986-1991 period: the difference between total foreign sales and exports from the United
States.Cost is the change in total (domestic plus foreign) cost of goods sold. The FTC dummy
variable takes the value one if a firm has excess foreign tax credits, and zero otherwise. The term
[A/(A+A)] is the ratio of a firm's foreign assets to its total assets in 1986. The variable Tax Loss
Carry/Assets is the ratio of tax loss carryforwards to total assets at yearend 1986. Debt/Assets is the
ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets at yearend 1986.Table 2
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Note: Firms are classified into cells basedonforeign asset/totalasset ratiosin 1986, and by foreign
taxcredit (FTC) statusascalculated over the 1986-1991 time period. (Change in Debt)/Assets
represents the differencebetweentotal debt in 1991 and total debt in 1986, divided by total assets in
1986.(Change in PPE)/Assets represents the difference between netproperty,plant, andequipment
in1991 and net property,plant, andequipmentin 1986, divided by total assetsin1986.Table 3
Changesin Preferred Stock, 1986-1991,by Foreign Asset Concentration andFTCStatus
Foreign AssetslTotal Assets
below Median above Median
Excess FTC Deficit FTC Excess FTC Deficit FTC














I Increases 9 10 17 10
I Decreases [Ci 14 12 17
Note: Firmsare classified into cells based on foreign assetitocal asset ratios in 1986, and by foreign
tax credit (FTC) status as calculated over the 1986-1991 time period. (Change in Preferred
Stock)/Assets represents the difference between preferred stock outstanding in 1991 and preferred
stock outstanding in 1986. divided by total assets in 1986. I Increases indicates the number of firms
in each cell for whom the difference between preferred stock outstanding in 1991 and preferredstock
outstanding in 1986 is positive; I Decreases indicates the number of firms for wflich thedifference is
negative.Table 4a
DebtAccumulation, 1986-1991
Dependent Variable: Change in Debt, 1986-1991/Assets 1986




[At/(A+A)J2 0.5243 0.8858 0.5469 0.9237
(0.2737) (0.3309) (0.2765) (0.3354)
FTC dummy- -0.6410 -0.9253 -0.6724 -0.9698
IAf(A+AW (0.3247) (0.3628) (0.3288) (0.3669)
Tax Loss Carry! -0.2588 -0.2791
Assets (0.1005) (0.1012)
Industry No No No Yes Yes
dummies
adj. R -0,001 0.006 0.021 0.010 0.027
No.Ohs. 416 416 387 416 376
Note:Standard errors areinparentheses. The columnsreport coefficientsfromOLS regressions in
whichthe dependentvariableis the ratio of the change in the book value of a firm'sdebt between
1986-1991 to its total assets in 1986. The FTC dummy takes the value one if a firm's average
foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutory corporate tax rate over the 1987-1991 period; the
dummy is zero otherwise. The term (A/(A+A)] is the ratio of a firm's foreign assets to its total
assets in 1986. The term [Tax Loss Carry/Assetsj is the ratio of tax loss carryforward at yearend
1986 to firm assets atyearend1986.Table 4b
Debt Accumulation, 1984-1986
Dependent Variable: Change in Debt, 1984-1986/Assets1986




(A*/(A+A*)12 -0.7118 -0.6585 -0.7250 -0.6844
(0.3228) (0.4048) (0.3297) (0.4150)
FTC dummy- 0.2911 0.2636 0.2793 0.2627
(A/(A ÷ At)]2 (0.3997) (0.4540) (0.4059) (0.4609)
TaxLossCarryl -0.1215 -0.1178
Assets (0.1192) (0.1215)
Industry No No No Yes Yes
dummies
adj.K2 -0.002 0.009 0.008 -0.004 -0.006
No.Obs. 386 386 362 386 362
Note:Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
whichthedependent variableis the ratio of the changein the book value of a firm's debt between
1984-1986witstotal assets in 1986. The FTC dummy takes the value one if a firm's average
foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutory corporate tax rate over the 1987-1991 period; the
dummy is zero otherwise. The term (A/(A+At)] is the ratio of a firm's Ibreign assets to its total
assets in 1986. The term [Tax Loss CarryfAssetsi is the ratio of tax loss carryforward at yearend
1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.Table Sa
PPEAccumulation, 1986-1991
DependentVariable: Change in Property, Plant, andEquipment, 1986-1991/Assets 1986




0.4592 0.6469 0.4032 0.5888
(0.2344) (0.2837) (0.2366) (0.2869)
FTC dummy- -0.5613 -0.6892 O.5545 O.6855
(0.2781) (0.3112) (0.2814) (0.3138)
Tax Loss Carry/ -0.2057 -412181
Assets (0.0861) (0.0824)
Industry No No No Yes Yes
dummies
adj. R2 0.007 0.007 0.016 0.013 0.027
No. Obs. 414 414 386 414 386
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the change in the book value of a firm's property, plant,
and equipment between 1986-1991 to its total assets in 1986. The FTC dummy takes the value one if
a firm's average foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutorycorporatetax rate over the 1987-
1991 period; the dummy is zero otherwise. The term [A*/(A+A*)] is the ratio of a firm's foreign
assets to its total assets in 1986. The term [Tax Loss Carry/Assets)isthe ratio of tax loss
carryforward at yearend 1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.Table Sb
PPEAccumulation, 1984-1986
DependentVariable: Change inProperty, Plant, and Equipment, 19841986/Assets1986




-0.1512 -0.0765 -0.1418 -0.0765
(0.1250) (0.1536) (0.1236) (0.1524)
FTC dummy' 0.1888 0.1568 0.1183 0.0973
(0.1547) (0.1721) (0.1520) (0.169!)
Tax Loss Carry! -0.128! -0.1343
Assets (0.0452) (0.0446)
Industry NC) No Yes Yes
duies
adj.R2 -0.002 0.000 0.021 0.051 0.070
No. Ohs. 385 385 361 385 361
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the changeinthe book value of a firm's property, plant
and equipment between 1984-1986 to its total assets in 1986. The FTC dummy takes the value one if
a firm's average foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutory corporate tax rate over the 1987-
1991 period; the dummy is zero otherwise. The term 1A/(A+A)I is the ratio of a firm's foreign
assets to its total assets in 1986. The term ITax Loss Carry/Assetsi is the ratio of tax loss
carrytbrward at yearend 1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.Table 6a
NewLeas, 1986-1991
Dependent Variable: New Leases, 1986-1991/Assets 1986
Constant 0.4694 0.3871 0.3608 0.4710 0.3842
(0.0690) (0.0530) (0.0611) (0.0891) (0.0561)




FTC dummy• 0.9994 0.5309 1.4469 1.0152
(0.4681) (0.7162) (0.8952) (0.4793)
Tax Loss Carry/ 0.1789
Assets (0.1946)
Industry No No No No No
dummies
adj. R? -0.001 0.012 0.011 0.018 0.013
No. Ohs. 286 286 286 286 268
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is a ratio. The numerator of the ratio is the difference between a firm's
leases of property, plant and equipment over 1986-1991 and its preexisting lease coinmittments at
yearend 1986. The denominator of the ratio is the firm's total assets at yearend 1986. The FTC
dummytakesthe value one if a firm's average foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutory
corporate taxrate over the 1987-1991 period;thedummyis zero otherwise. Theterm(At/(A+At)1
istheratioof a firm'sforeignassets to its total assets in 1986. The term [Tax Loss Carry/Assetsj is
the ratio of taxloss carryfbrwardat yearend 1986 tofirmassetsatyearend 1986.Table 6b
New Leases,1986-1991
Dependent Variable: New Leases, 1986-1991/Assets 1986
Constant




FTdummy- 0.5654 0.4845 1.3867 0.6105
[A/(A + As)) (0.4157) (0.6247) (0.7744) (0.4306)
Tax Loss Carryl 0.1114
Assets (0.1683)
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
dummies
adj. R 0.28! 0.283 0.281 0.288 0.268
No. Ohs. 286 286 286 286 268
Note:Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is a ratio. The numerator of the ratio is the difference between a firm's
leases of property, plant and equipment over 1986-1991 and its preexisting lease committments at
yearend 1986. The denominator of the ratio is the firm's total assets at yearend 1986. The FTC
dummy takes the value one if a firm's average foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutory
corporate tax rate over the 1987-1991 period; the dummy is zero otherwise. The term [A5/(A+A)]
is the ratio of a firm's foreign assets to its total assets in 1986. The term [Tax Loss Carry/Assets) is
the ratio of tax loss carryforward at yearend 1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.Table 7*
Foreign-ProducedForeign Sal, 1986-1991
Dependent Variable:Foreign-Produced Foreign Sales, 1986-1991/Assets 1986






FTC dummy' -0.4151 -0.2442 -0.3043 -0.1583
[Debt/Assets] (0.2069) (0.2334) (0.1927) (0,2201)
Tax Loss Carry/ -0.0979 -0.0766
Assets (0.1340) (0.1347)
Industry No No No Yes Yes
dummies
adj. R2 -0.001 0.007 0.011 0.003 0.013
No. Ok. 409 409 409 381 381
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from 01_S regressions in
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the change, from 1986-1991, in a firm's foreign-produced
foreign sales [the difference between total foreign sales and exports from the United States] to total
assets at yearend 1986. The FTC dummy takes the value one if a firm's average foreign tax rate
exceeds the average US statutory corporate tax rate over the 1987-1991 period; the dummy is zero
otherwise.Debt/Assets is the ratio ofthe book value of debt to the book value of total assets at
yearend 1986. Theterm(Tax Loss Carry/Assets is the ratio of tax loss carryforward at earend
1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.Table 7b
Foreign-Produced Foreign Sales, 1986-1991





FTC dummy- -0.4045 -0.2344 -0.3747 -0.2936 -0.1760
[DebtlAssetsl (0.2053) (0.2315) (0.2076) (0.1908) (0.2182)
Tax Loss Carry! -0.1890 -0.1685
Assets (0.1362) (0.1374)
ForeignAssets! 0.623 I 0.6220 0.5911 0.6502 0.6273
TotalAssets (0.2254) (0.2249) (0.2272) (0.2215) (0.2224)
Industry No No Yes Yes Yes
dummies
adj. R 0.023 0.027 0.033 0.023 0.0 13
No. Obs. 409 409 409 381 381
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the change, from 1986-1991, in a firm's foreign-produced
foreign sales [the difference between total foreign sales and exports from the United Statesj to total
assets at yearend 1986.TheFTC dummy takes the value one if a firm's average foreign tax rate
exceeds the average US statutory corporate tax rate over the 1987-199 I period; the dummy is zero
otherwise.DebtlAssets is theratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets at
yearend 1986. The term ITax LossCarrylAssetsjis the ratio of tax loss carryfbrward at yearend
1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.Foreign Assets/TotalAssetsisthe ratio of book values of
foreignassetsandtotalassets in1986.Table 8a
Changein Scale ot Operations,1986-1991



































No No No Yes Yes
adj. R 0.002 0.003 0.014 0.024 0.035
No. Obs. 416 416 387 416 387
Note: Standard errors arein parentheses.The columns report coefficientsfromOLS regressionsin
whichthe dependent variable is the ratio of the change in a firm's total (domestic plus foreign) cost of
goods sold between1986-1991to its total assets in 1986. The FFC dummy takes the value one if a
firm'saverage foreign tax rate exceedstheaverage US statutorycorporate tax rate overthe 1987-
1991 period; the dummy is zero otherwise. The term[A*/(A+A*)]is the ratio of a firm's foreign
assets to its totalassets in1986. The term fl'ax LossCarry/Assets]is theratioof taxloss
carryforwardat yearend 1986 to firm assetsatyearend 1986.Table 8b
Changein Scale orOperations,1984-1986



































No No No Yes Yes
a*Jj. R2 0.002 -0.001 0.004 0.005 0.013
No. Obs. 385 385 361 385 361
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The columns report coefficients from OLS regressions in
which the dependent variable is the ratio of the change in a firm's total (domestic plus foreign) cost of
goods sold between 1984-1986 to its total assets in 1986. The FTC dummy takes the value one if a
firm's average foreign tax rate exceeds the average US statutory corporate tax rate over the 1987-
1991 period; the dummy is zero otherwise. The term 1A/(A + A)1 is the ratio of a firm's foreign
assets to its total assets in 1986. The term ITax Loss Carry/Assets] is the ratio of tax loss
carryforward at yearend 1986 to firm assets at yearend 1986.